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The petition Jor rehearing lists six alleged errors of this 
court as a basis lor rehearing. For practical purposes the 
said alleged errors may be classified into two groups namely, 
first: Alleged error of this court in upholding the decision 
of the lower court that the estate of Richard H. Spencer 
rather than J olm Edison Spencer is entitled to the residue of 
'1<8 ;;harPs o£ Class "A" stock in Indianola Irrigation Company 
represented hy Ce; tilicates No. 72 and No. 73; and, second: 
Alleged error o:· this court in not <·!early a,;sessing ('O~b 
hetwef'n tiH~ parties. 
We shall ('Oll<'crn ourselves primarily with an attempt 
to !lleet the argllnwnt of counsel concerning the first named 
question, for W(" Jed that i£ this court rightfully denies a 
rehearing upon that basis it would hardly be justifif'd in 
granting a rel1earing merely for the purpose of clarifying the 
question of cost,;. 
Couns!·l for appellants contends that Johu Edison Spencer 
and not the ~~,.tatf' oi. l\ !chard H. Spencer is enitled to the 
said residue of ;1,g clun•·' of water. and as a basis for the 
contention he ::! tcm pis t: 1 draw an analogy between the 
manner in whi•:h John Edison Spencer allegedly acquired 
title thereto and the method whereby the 55 shares of water 
passed through H ugentobler to Que Jensen, and the manner 
in which the title t<J the (JO shares of water was acquired hy 
James C. Whiaaker, and the manner in which the title to 
the 285 shares of sock in the Indianola Irrigation Company 
passed through the Federal Building and Loan Association 
to its present owners. Howewr, we shall show that sueh 
analogy cloes not in fact exist. 
The deed to John Edison Spencer upon which appellants 
rely for their claim to the 48 shares of Class "A" stock in 
Indianola Irrigation Company, conveys the land "together 
with 80 acres of water in what is known as Thistle Creek." 
There is no other or further conveyance, or judgment, or 
decree, or proceeding whatever vesting title to the water 
shares in question in John Edison Spencer. ln £act the evi· 
dence shows, and the trial court so held, and this court 
has sustained the trial court\ findings tlu~reon, that Richard 
H. Spencer treated CertiJicatt~c Nos. 72 and 73 as his own 
property, that Certificates Nos. 72 and 73 were endorsed 
by Richard H. Spencer to L ;\1. Price as security for a debt 
which was later paid ( tr. 668) ; and that the purpose of ex-
changing Certificate No. 57 :for Certificates Nos. 72 and 
73 was to enable Hichard H. Spencer to secure two small 
loans, which could more readily be obtained than one large 
one ( tr. 629). There is no evidence in the record that John 
Edison Spencer ever exercised dominion over the water 
stock rPpresented hy Certificates Nos. 72 and 7:~, or that 
he was ever the owner of the said stot;k. In fact, it appears 
to he clear that his name was used only as a ennvemence or 
as an accommodation to his fathPr. 
By way of contrast between the facts surronnding the 
,;tock claimed by the appellant and the facts with respect to 
the other water stock, we respectfully call attention to the 
fact that the 55 shares of water now decreed to be the prop-
erty of Que Jensen were mortgaged by the owner in 1922 to 
Simon Hugentobler, the mortgage was subsequently fore-
closed and the water stock was sold at foreclosure sale to 
llugentobler, and thereafter Que Jensen, by mesne con-
yevances, became the owner thereof. As this honorable court 
;-;tated in its dt>cisi1;11, "For all practical purposes, It IS con-
ceded hy aU parties concerned that Que Jensen is entitled to 
SS shares or acre~ of primary rights. The only question 
which ari~es as lo him, is that of determining from which 
stock certificate his shares are to be deducted. This matter, 
however, was determined in Case No. 2888 * * * * ." As 
compared to a mortgage, a decree of foreclosure, a fore-
closure snle and ~heriff's deed, in the case of 55 shares of 
water claimed hy Que Jensen, the appellant here claims the 
Indianola Wetter ~lock upon the simple basis of a Warranty 
Deed given ]Jy Hichard H. Spencer conveying certain land 
"together with 80 acres of water in what is known as Thistle 
Creek," the "aid deed having been made at a time when 
the grantor owned WJ shares whatever in Thistle Creek, hav-
ing theretofore conveyed more shares of such water than he 
owned, and neither Richard H. Spencer nor the adminis-
trator of his estal.l' has since acquired any shares whatever 
in Thistle Creek or i:s tributaries directly. Surely there is 
no analogy hclwcen the hasis o£ the claim of Que Jensen and 
that of John Edison :~pencer. 
Tfw ,.;mn<' principl(·,; lwreinahove (~tmmerated apply with 
respect to the alleged clllalogy between the claims of Johu 
Edison Spencer and thi)sc of Whittaker, with this additional 
factor: The mortgage to tlw hank commissioner upon which 
Whittaker's claim i:-; based n~cited specifically "60 shares 
or acres of water right owned by Richard H. Spencer in the 
waters of Indianola Creek, Thistle and Rock Creek." The 
same principles likewise apply with respect to the alleged 
analogy between the basis o£ the claim of John Edison 
Spencer and that of the present successor to the water stock 
mortgaged to Fedt'ral Building and Loan Association, with 
Lhis additional factor: The latter mortgage specifically 
described "285 shares o£ capital stock in the Indianola 
Irrigation Company, a corporation." 
The sole hasis for the appellant's application for re-
hearing boils down to his contention that because Richard H. 
Spencer made a Warranty Deed to John Edison Spencer 
conveying certain land "together with 80 acres of water in 
what io, known as Thistle Creek," even though the grantor 
had no right or title to any such water at the time the deed 
was made, the grantee now has a valid title to any water 
rights that Richard H. Spencer may subsequently acquire. 
Counsel in his hrief for rehearing, at the outset, states: "We 
shall not in our argument in support of our petition, reargue 
the que~tion of the appurtenaney of the water to the land," 
and then seeks to accomplish the same purpose by arguing 
in substanr:e that because a Warranty Deed conveys after 
acquired title, therefore. this \Varranty Deed automatically 
conveys to the grantee the shares of Indianola Irrigation 
Company stock which subsequently passed to the administra-
tor of tlw t~slatt~ of Richard H. Spencer. 
The appellant's t:untention in this regard is based solely 
upon Seuion 78-1-9, Utah Code Annotated, 191.3, which 
reads ac; follow,.;: 
"'If <Ill) pcr,.;on ,.;hall ht~reafter convey <lilY real eslale 
by cmJ~eyance purporting to convey the ~arne. in fee simple 
absolute, and shall not at the time of such conveyance 
have the leg a I estate in such real estate, but shall after-
wards acquire the same, the legal estate subsequently 
at:quired shall immediately pass to the grantee, his heirs, 
,;uccessors or assigns, and such conveyance shall be as 
if such legal estate had been in the grantor at the time of 
the conveyance." 
It will be noted that this section applies specifically and 
exclusively to real estate. The Utah statutes do not contain 
any comparable provision with respect to personal property. 
The trial court held, and this court aflirmed such holding, 
that the shares of water in controversy are not appurtenant 
to the land, and the appellant has specifically stated that 
he will not reargue this question, yet he seeks to accomplish 
the same purpose by urging the doctrine of estoppel by deed 
as having the effect of transferring automatically to him cer-
tain shares of stock oJ the Indianola Irrigation Company, 
which were strictly personal property, and which were not 
specifically recited in the deed. We submit that the only way 
that the estoppel could apply to the water stock in questi,;:J 
would be upon the basis that the said water ,;tock w:1-.; 
appurtenant to the land. 
In order to apply the doctrine contended Jor hy the 
appellant this court mu~t first ignore all of the evidence in the 
case tending to show that Richard H. Spencer treated the 
water stock as his own, and that the purpo~e of tht~ exchange 
of Certificate No. 57 for Certificates Nos. 72 and 73 was to 
enable Richard H. Spencer to secure two small loans instead 
of one. Then, having concluded that the water stdck is not 
appurtenant to the land, the court would have to conclude 
that the Indianola Irrigation stock is the identical stock as 
that described in the Warranty Deed as "80 acres of water 
in what is known as Thistle Creek." This, of course, obviously 
is not the fact. Then the court would next have to con-
clude that the law in Utah with respeet to the doctrine of 
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estoppel by deed applies with equal force to personalty. If 
the legislature had intended that the doctrine set forth m 
Section 78-1-9 of Utah Code Annotated, 1943, applied to 
personal property it could easily have so stated. The appel-
lant in his brief has cited some general law on this question 
as well as a few specific cases, but no cases have been cited 
in support of his view in this jurisdiction, and we have looked 
m vain for any such cases. 
There is, m fact, sounrl hasis in reason and logic for 
holding that the rule cannot he applierl with equal force to con-
veyances of personal property as to those of real property. 
The rule in England, in which jurisdiction the common 
law had its inception, is well stated in the case of Bryans v. 
Nix, R M & W. 775. 150 Reprint 1634, 1642: 
"It is proper, howevn, to notice the very ingenious ar-
gument used on the part of the plaintiffs, founded on 
the doctrine of estoppel, as applied to real estate. If a 
man, by indenture, demise a certain manor which he has 
not, and then purchases the manor, and afterwards sells 
or demises to B., the first lease operates against the pur-
chaser or second lessee; and by analogy to this case, it 
is contended that the first bill of lading was good for 
the plaintiffs by estoppel, against the master, and con-
signor; and against the defendant, who claims that 
cargo which was put on board under the consignor. But 
this analogy does not hold; in the case of real property, 
the lease is a conclusive admission by the lessor, that he 
has a title to the specific estate demised, which binds a 
subsequent purchaser of that estate; here the bill of lading 
is a conclusive admission only that some oats, amounting 
to the specified quantity, were on board. In the former 
case, the estate is identified and ascertained at the time 
of the arlmission; in the latter. no property existerl to 
which the admission applied, for no oats were on hoard; 
and they are not otherwise ascertained, than by that 
statement that they were on hoard; and the person who 
afterwards purchases any oats from the consignor, might 
as well he said to purchase those to which the estoppel 
relates, as he who purchases those which were afterwards 
put on hoard. And besides, it may well he doubted 
whether the doctrine of estoppel applies to personal 
chattels at all, so as to hind a subsequent purchaser of 
them." 
It should also he born in mind that there is no magic, with 
respect to the doctrine contended for by appellants, in a 
Warranty Deed. There are numerous leading cases whidt 
hold that there is no estoppel when a deed, even with the 
strongest of covenants, purports to convey and warrant 
merely the present inlt~rest of the grantor. SonH~ 0 r tht~SC C:tc;es 
are the following: 
Hanrid( v. Patrick, 7 S.Ct. 117, 119 U.S. 1:)6, :)0 L.Ed. 
:396; 
Tillotson v. Kennedy, 5 Ala. 1.07, ;)9 Am. Dec. :t)O: 
Porter v. Henderson, 82 So. 668, 203 Ala. :312; 
Kimball v. Sample, 25 Cal. 4/1.0; 
Holbrook v. Debo, 99 Ill. 372; 
Stephenson v. Boody, 38 N.E. :3:31, 139 fnd. 60; 
Loomis v. Pingree, 43 Me. 299; 
Comstock v. Smith. ] 3 Pick., Mass., 1] 6, 23 Am. D. 670; 
Bogy v. Shoah, 13 Mos. 365; 
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Bell v. Twilight, 26 N.H. 401; 
Adams v. Ross, 30 N.J.L. 505, 82 Am. Dec. 237; 
White v. Brocaw, 14 Ohio St. 339; 
Wynn v. Harman, 5 Grat. ( 46 Va.) 157; 
Western Min., etc., Co. v. Peytona Cannel Coal Co., 8 
W.Va. 406; 
21 c..r. ] 084, notf' !1<9. 
It should be noted in this connection that although the 
deed to John Edison Spencer upon which he relies for his 
claim was a Warranty Deed, there is nothing in the language 
of that instrument which purports to represent that the gran-
tor owned any shares of Indianola Irrigation Company stock, 
nor is there anything therein inconsistent with the premisf~ 
that the grantor conveyed merely such interest in "80 acres of 
water in what is known as Thistle Creek" as the grantor then 
owned. 
We also point Ollt that the principle of title by e~toppel, 
or feeding the estoppel, has been lwld to have no application 
in cases where the grantor afterwards acquires title through 
an independent source. McCune v. McCune ( 1937) 23 Cal. 
App. (2d) 295, 72 P (2d) 883; Schultz v. Cities Serv. 
Oil Co. (1939) 149 Kan. 148,86 P(2d) 533; Federal Land 
Hank v. Johnson (193.~) 205 NC 180, ] 70 SE 658. 
In conclusion we respectfully submit that, there being 
reasonable evidence to sustain the decision of the trial court 
on the points argued in appellants' petition for rehearing, 
and this court having sustained the finding of the trial court 
lO 
thereon, the appellants have not shown sufficient cause for 
the granting of a rehearing in this matter, and that the 
decision of this court heretofore made should stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY & NELSON 
Attorneys for Richard Leo Spencer, 
Administrator of the estate of Rich-
ard H. Spencer, deceased. 
